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Abstract 
The article argues that deliberative democracy has now entered a third generation, 
which the three recent books considered here contribute to. The first generation 
included the normative assertions of Habermas and Rawls. The second generation 
involved the fusing of these two first generationalists, and reconciling them with 
features of social complexity. The second generation has rendered deliberative 
democracy more practically achievable, and the three books here seize this 
opportunity to provide considerable institutional innovation about how to achieve the 
reformed deliberative theory in practice. In doing this the third generation of 
deliberative democracy is emerging. In the main, a more practically relevant version 
of deliberative democracy is welcomed, but we must also guard against jettisoning its 
normative ideals in the process. 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent history of the theory of deliberative democracy has been auspicious, to the 
extent that it now dominates theoretical discussions of democracy, and is starting to 
receive broad coverage in practical discussions of democracy. Not only does this 
suggest that deliberative democracy has ‘come of age’ (Bohman, 1998), and taken an 
‘empirical turn’ (Dyzek, 2008), but that a third generation of deliberative democracy 
is emerging, of which the books considered here are a part. First generation 
deliberative democrats, like Habermas and Rawls, debated the normative 
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justifications of deliberative democracy, interpretations, and necessary components of 
the theory, but failed to take account of the sheer complexity of contemporary 
societies. First generation deliberative democrats thought reason exchange to be the 
only applicable form of communication, which would result in uniform preference 
change, ending in consensus. 
 
Second generation deliberative democrats, particularly Bohman (1996) and Gutmann 
and Thompson (1996), in considering the instutionalisation of deliberative 
democracy, took complexity seriously, and reformed the theory of deliberative 
democracy in the process. They have fused the first generation deliberative 
democracy of Habermas and Rawls with practical requirements.  Our understandings 
of deliberative democracy have been transformed in the process. For the second 
generation deliberative democrats the predominant view is that preferences will adapt 
to public reason and new information, but not in a uniform manner. Consequently 
consensus will not be reached and forms of communication other than reason 
exchange can, will, and should be included. However, they still offered little 
substantive detail in terms of the type of institutions required to ensure deliberative 
democracy could be actualised in complex societies. This has paved the way for a 
third generation to emerge who have sought to establish the nature of the institutions 
required to achieve this reconciliation in practice. Recent work by Baber and Bartlett 
(2005), O’Flynn (2006), and Parkinson (2006), all considered here, contribute to 
emergence of this third generation of deliberative democracy, and provide many 
interesting ideas on the directions that deliberative democracy needs to move in if it is 
to become a theoretically robust, sustainable, and dominant model of democracy in 
practice. The movement from first to second generation deliberative democracy, 
together with how the three books covered here accept these revised second 
generation premises, is set out in section one of the article.  
 
Section two considers the varying approaches to institutionalisation covered in the 
texts. These books are very different, as they attempt to offer practically applicable 
solutions to achieve deliberatively democratic public policy-making in very different 
contexts. Bader and Bartlett’s (2005) concern is environmental policy, with most of 
the evidence drawn from the USA, which leads to a call for transnational deliberative 
democracy. O’Flynn (2006) considers public policy in general in deeply divided 
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societies and the need for an inclusive national identity. Parkinson (2006) considers 
public policy in established liberal democracies, although his empirical evidence is 
drawn from health policy in the UK, and makes suggestions for a democratic agenda-
setting process. Despite these differences all three works accept the increasing focus 
on institutionalisation. Moreover, the empirical evidence, apparent in these three 
works, points clearly to the growing trend of deliberative theorists to accept aspects of 
second generation deliberative democracy and its accommodation of social 
complexity. This leads to other similarities and central to the third generation of 
deliberative democracy, and reflected in the books here, is a distinction between 
micro and macro approaches to institutionalisation. Barber and Bartlett (2005) argue 
that it is essential for a range of institutional types to adapt deliberative democracy to 
the features of social complexity. Parkinson (2006) agrees, but underlines the need for 
decision-making, opinion forming and agenda setting deliberative institutions to be 
integrated. Finally, O’Flynn (2006), in applying deliberative democracy to the 
intensely socially complex entities of ethnically divided societies, argues that 
consociational democracy should be supplemented with deliberative processes in civil 
society. The symbiotic relationship between empirical research and normative theory 
present in the third generation is welcomed, but we must also guard against jettisoning 
the normative ideals of deliberative democracy in the process. 
 
From First to Second Generation Deliberative Democracy: Fusing Habermas 
and Rawls 
 
Baber and Bartlett (2005) identify three broad versions of deliberative democracy: 
Rawlsian, Habermasian and ‘full liberalism.’ The main proponents of full liberalism 
are the Habermasian Bohman (1996), and the Rawlsians Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996) (although Bohman’s work receives by far the most coverage by Baber and 
Bartlett). In essence it is a fusion of Habermas’s and Rawls’s work, with the features 
of social complexity, most notably pluralism, scale, inequality, the need for expertise 
and globalisation. Unfortunately, Baber and Bartlett fail to tell us why they have 
chosen the term ‘full liberalism’. The generational approach, adopted here, 
incorporates much of Baber and Bartlett’s analysis, but with less ideological baggage 
and greater analytical clarity that also allows for further related developments within 
the field, such as third generation deliberative democracy, to which the books 
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considered here, including Baber and Bartlett’s, are a part. A generational approach 
achieves this while not overstating the similarities. 
 
The first generation of deliberative democracy derived from differing interpretations 
of Kant’s ‘transcendental formula’ (1957). Rawls (1993) perceives it as a hypothetical 
publicity test, suggesting that if a law or policy is to be right, it must have the capacity 
to endure publicity. Alternatively Habermas (1996) claims that laws and policies must 
actually be made and tested through rational public debate, as we have no other way of 
knowing if policies have the capacity of being public. This vital distinction on public 
reason leads to two contrasting versions of deliberative democracy. 
 
Rawls (1993) takes a procedural approach to public reason, but rather than forcing 
private interests to be justified in a public setting, he employs the original position 
where citizens deliberate to reach consensus through a veil of ignorance about their 
particular circumstances. Consequently, private interests are in effect eradicated from 
the process altogether, as is bargaining, enabling people to act rationally AND 
reasonably. Public deliberation is therefore successful if it is just, which for Rawls is a 
more stringent requirement than legitimacy. Justice is achieved when people 
unanimously and voluntarily consent, in fair circumstances, to bind themselves to the 
application of certain principles of a political order, which are then bound in a 
constitution (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, chapter 3).  
 
For Habermas (1996) public deliberation is successful providing the procedures that 
regulate it are objectively legitimate, and result in consensus. This is because he 
intends public discourse to reconcile normative disputes. Procedures are objectively 
legitimate if all relevant actors are included in a substantively equal and unlimited 
discourse. It is suggested that such processes will enable existing power relationships 
to be transformed, and for common interests to be promoted (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, 
p. 83). Despite these differences, both Habermas and Rawls can be classified as first 
generation deliberative democrats, chronologically, and because they focus on the 
normative elements of democratic deliberation and the ideal conditions related to 
them, rather than the far from perfect reality of complex modern societies. 
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It is essentially the features of complexity, mainly diversity, scale and socio-economic 
inequality, the need for specialists, and globalization that motivated Bohman (1996) 
and Gutmann and Thompson (1996) to attempt to diverge from, and fuse, the theories 
of Habermas and Rawls (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 34, p. 101).  In doing this a 
second generation of deliberative democracy was born. For Bohman, in particular, a 
realistic conception of deliberative democracy must acknowledge cultural pluralism 
and its challenge to common goods and unitary public reason; social inequalities 
would mean the exclusion of permanent minorities from public deliberation; that 
large-scale public organisations are inevitable; and finally due to community bias 
there is a restriction on the problems that will be acknowledged and solutions that are 
considered feasible (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 107).  
 
In the second generational view reasons are public and successful if citizens are 
willing to accept the resulting majority decisions, or that these decisions are at least 
sufficiently acceptable that citizens continue to participate in deliberation. Bohman 
calls this ‘plural agreement’ (1996, p. 34, p. 89), while Gutmann & Thompson, term it 
‘deliberative disagreement’ (1996, pp. 73-9). The second generational approach also 
assumes that people are motivated by their own interests (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996, p. 176-7), and that these interests can be temporarily reconciled through public 
deliberation, but never resolved (Bohman, 1996, pp. 72-3). These premises point to a 
further move away from first to second generation deliberative democracy in terms of 
the roles of preference change, consensus and reason in deliberative democracy, that 
deserve detailed discussion. It is also important to highlight how the three more recent 
volumes on deliberative democracy by Baber and Bartlett (2005), O’Flynn (2006), 
and Parkinson (2006) accept many of these second generation premises. 
 
Unitary Public Reason & Preference Change 
 
Deliberative democrats conceive preferences as endogenous; formed during the 
political process, rather than prior to it. Through consideration of differing reasons, 
existing preferences can be transformed and new preferences formed (Elstub, 2008, p. 
82). Rawls (1993, pp. 217-20) and Habermas (1995, p. 117) both argue that these 
reasons should be universal and impartial, and if they were, would eventually lead to 
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preference convergence. However, due to social diversity second generation 
deliberative democrats are more sceptical about the extent and conformity of 
preference adaptation, and envisage public reason as being plural (Bohman, 1996, pp. 
80-3). Psychological research has indicated that reflective preference transformation 
will be limited because people are unresponsive to reasons that do not support their 
preconceptions of an issue (Femia, 1996, pp. 378-81). Therefore ‘the force of an 
argument is always relative’ (Manin, 1987, p.  353) and if rational arguments are to 
persuade an agent of a new belief, it must start by appealing to their present beliefs 
(Christiano, 1997, p. 260). Consequently, participants in debate will offer different 
reasons to persuade different citizens of the need for the same outcome and, therefore, 
will not be public in the way envisioned by Habermas and Rawls (Gaus, 1997; Elstub, 
2008, p. 73). 
 
The authors of the books discussed here agree, in line with second generation 
deliberative democracy, that preference change is inevitably limited. Parkinson’s book 
focuses on the motivational problems related to deliberative democracy in practice; 
one of these being pre-deliberative commitments, which can restrict the extent of 
preference change. The suggestion is that people participate in decision-making in the 
first place because they are partial and self-interested. In addition people will often 
publicly defend their initial position, even when they come to realise it is wrong out of 
solidarity or in order to save face (Parkinson, 2006, pp. 37-8). Moreover, these pre-
deliberative commitments are not equally distributed which offsets the deliberative 
process, meaning some preferences do not get considered fairly and fully (Parkinson, 
2006, p. 134). Baber and Bartlett also note the intractability of preferences related to 
distinct interests and identities. In contrast though, they are more optimistic about the 
potential for such preferences to be transformed in a deliberative process, although 
they accept that those with strong religious convictions might be less likely to adapt 
preferences as they are not seeking compromise, but believe their preferences to be the 
truth (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p.  222).  
 
O’Flynn appreciates that these problems of preference change are intensified in 
divided societies especially in relation to preferences that are connected to the 
underlying values of an ethnic group (O’Flynn, 2006). In divided societies, although 
people and groups can and do change fundamental values, attempts to persuade 
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people to do so ‘are likely to be interpreted as surreptitious attempts at cultural 
assimilation, and hence may increase tensions rather than reduce them’ (O’Flynn, 
2006, p. 90). Therefore, as with the second generation deliberative democrats, 
O’Flynn also believes that the need for deliberators to offer reasons that are 
acceptable to all is a very demanding requirement, as in reality, people may offer 
reasons that are aimed at a majority, or the largest minority (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 5). 
These aspects are of even greater intensity in divided societies ‘where the polarisation 
of political life is often extreme and the willingness of people to engage with 
members of competing ethnic groups is often in short supply’ (O’Flynn, 2006, pp. 5-
7). Consequently, the reasonable and shared political values that Rawls and Habermas 
believe citizens to appeal to are less likely to exist in divided societies, and if such 
values do exist they will be the subject of intense ‘interpretative dispute’ and public 
reason would become redundant (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 95). The solution, for O’Flynn, is 
for discussion to operate at a high level of abstraction (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 97).  
 
Consensus on the Common Good 
 
From the expectation that preferences in a deliberative democracy will change in light 
of universal public reasons, Habermas (1996, pp. 17-19) and Rawls (1993, p.169) 
assert that this can lead to a consensus on the common good. For Habermas consensus 
is constitutive of democratic deliberation, as without it we would be less inclined to 
engage in the exchange of reasons, and more inclined to act instrumentally (Baber and 
Bartlett, 2005, p. 89). An overlapping consensus on reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines that will regulate society is important to Rawls if 
justice is to be secured (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 36). For both, first generation 
deliberative democrats, publicity ensures that reasons are offered that do not represent 
partial and specific interests, but rather the common good, and therefore consensus 
will eventually be reached.  
 
Due to diversity, the limitations of preference change, and the plurality of public 
reasons offered in a deliberative democracy, second generation deliberative democrats 
are sceptical that consensus will be achieved (Bohman, 1996, pp. 85-9). Moreover, as 
a key democratic requirement of the ideal of deliberative democracy is that all should 
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be included in deliberation; this will mean more opinions, potentially making 
agreement harder to achieve (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 42). Debate can also 
increase disagreement as well as reduce it (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 44; 
Elstub 2006a, p. 308). However, according to second generation deliberative 
democrats consensus is not required for legitimacy, but simply the greater 
dissemination of relevant knowledge and information. Legitimate decisions can be 
made by a majority of participants who themselves agree for a plurality of reasons. As 
there is no requirement for all to share the same reasons for agreement, for the second 
generationalists, agreement can be reached through compromise under deliberative 
conditions (Bohman, 1996, pp. 89-104; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 43). 
 
Parkinson (2006) does not explicitly address the issue of consensus; however, as will 
be discussed later, his institutional suggestions do seem to rely on a degree of it. 
Therefore it is possible that Parkinson is not quite of the second generation, at least in 
this respect. Nevertheless, Baber and Bartlett are, concluding that majority rule is 
justified, because consensus is impractical given the moral complexity of 
contemporary societies, there is often a need for expedient decisions, and the act of 
delaying a decision in the hope of reaching consensus, is a decision in itself, and one 
that will be in line more with the interests of some participants, usually those 
benefiting from the status quo: ‘To delay deciding is to delay acting; to fail to decide 
is a decision not to act. All are options that are always value-laden and inherently 
biased’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 176). However, they maintain that certain 
decisions should require a consensus, as a decision to log a forest cannot be reversed 
(Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 177). Where consensus cannot be achieved ‘compromise 
is the second best alternative, acceptable only when discourse has shown that there is 
no common interest to be found’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 89).  
 
O’Flynn also sympathises with second generation deliberative democrats in respect to 
consensus. He highlights how focusing on ‘common’ interests can exclude the more 
specific, but still relevant interests, of excluded and marginalised groups (O’Flynn, 
2006, pp. 126-9).  The source of the reasons, rather than the reasons themselves, will 
therefore be decisive (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 129), due to the absence of an agreed 
standard to judge the reasons. O’Flynn considers Bellamy’s (1999) account of 
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compromise in some depth. For Bellamy compromise can achieve ‘shareable solutions 
to common problems’  through all giving concessions to others, meaning that, 
inevitably not all agree with all aspects of the compromised decision: ‘though they 
consider the agreement as the most acceptable to all concerned, each retains his or her 
own view of what is best’ (Bellamy, cited in O’Flynn, 2006, p. 91). Ultimately the 
need for compromise, combined with reciprocity, leads to an increase in 
multidimensional decisions, with all having differing reasons for accepting the 
package of solutions (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 92).  In this sense, O’Flynn is arguably the 
most ‘second generational’ of the authors considered here, presumably because of his 
concern with deeply divided societies, where the ideal of rational consensus seems to 
have little traction. 
 
Applicable forms of Communication 
 
Both Habermas (1996, p. 541) and Rawls (1993) have conceived deliberative 
democracy as being based purely on the exchange of reasons, with other forms of 
communication, most notably rhetoric, being ‘the negation of reasoning’ that ‘can 
serve only to distort the deliberative process’, that leads to arbitrary decisions based 
upon partial worldviews (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, pp. 143-4). 
 
In contrast the now familiar arguments from ‘difference democrats’ such as Young 
(1996), Sanders (1997) and Williams (2000) accept that the model of deliberative 
democracy is formally inclusive in the sense that it seeks the participation of all, but 
claim that it is not substantially inclusive because the complete dependence on 
rational forms of communication privilege dominant social groups. They argue that 
deliberative democracy will enable certain groups to participate more and, therefore, 
dominate decision-making, that rational argument cannot challenge existing 
inequalities, and finally that it is culturally specific and disadvantages subordinate 
groups (Elstub, 2006b, pp. 31-2). It is such considerations that lead Young to 
advocate ‘communicative democracy’ (1996), which she suggests will differ from 
deliberative democracy by favouring greeting, rhetoric and storytelling over rational 
argument, rendering communication more compatible with a diverse range of social 
groups. Second generation deliberative democracy, with its attempt to accommodate 
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pluralism, has room for these other forms of communication (Bohman, 1996, pp. 116-
23; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, pp. 132-7), as do the authors considered here. 
 
The potential social and cultural bias of deliberative democracy is one of the aspects 
that Parkinson identifies as exacerbating, and even causing, motivation problems 
amongst potential actors in deliberatively democratic decision-making, encouraging 
some social groups to exclude themselves from biased deliberative processes 
(Parkinson, 2006, p. 36). Therefore, Parkinson, accepts that greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling could, and should, play a part in deliberation, and his case studies provide 
useful empirical evidence to indicate that these styles of communication are included 
in ‘real world’ approximations of deliberative democracy, suggesting that collective 
deliberation is compatible with ‘a range of communicative styles’ (Parkinson, 2006, 
pp. 139-42). O’Flynn also accepts that these forms of communication must be 
included in the deliberative process. He argues that stories act as ‘causes, reflectors 
and exacerbaters’ and highlight the psychocultural dramas at the centre of the ethnic 
conflicts (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 135). Baber and Bartlett suggest that not only are reason 
and rhetoric compatible, as emotions are subject to rational persuasion, but are 
inevitable as they cannot be ‘disentangled by complex human beings who are always 
simultaneously rational and emotional’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 144).  
 
Nevertheless, second generation deliberative democracy, deriving as it does from first 
generation deliberative democracy, does not abandon reason altogether and it is still 
seen as the most vital form of communication. O’Flynn maintains that storytelling and 
rhetoric must move from particular experience to a general principle, as only reasons 
can be shared in a manner, over time, that can form the basis of policy. Decisions 
must therefore be based on reasons, as reasons can be shared in a manner 
unobtainable to storytelling, as the latter are often personal and not common (O’Flynn 
2006: 137; Elstub, 2008, p. 91). Moreover, not all story-telling is applicable, and 
O’Flynn is concerned about its use to demand loyalty and conformity from all ethnic 
and cultural group members. Narratives must therefore connect the particular to the 
general, otherwise they can be exclusive themselves: ‘General principles restrict the 
scope that manipulative elites might otherwise have to silence internal dissent. Since 
they are general, they cannot be used to further one set of ethnic interests while at the 
 11 
same time inhibiting some other.’ Consequently, narratives must still form some 
connection to those who have not experienced the event(s), highlighting the situation 
of a broader group, not simply individuals (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 138; see also Baber and 
Bader, 2005, p.144; Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 137). Parkinson’s case study 
evidence indicates that deliberators were able to make rational judgements on the 
rhetoric employed, although they did not always do so (Parkinson, 2006, pp. 139-42). 
Baber and Bartlett note the rhetoric of culturally specific groups is a specialised 
discourse. In order for genuine public communication to occur, that includes all 
groups, all discourses, including those emerging from minority cultural groups, must 
be communicated in a way that all can understand: ‘Only when competing discourses 
express themselves in fully public terms can dominant social groups see them as 
potential sources of solutions for problems with which the dominant paradigm cannot 
cope’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2006, p. 160). Finally, stories are also open to contestation 
and without rational argument, can only bring differences to the attention of 
participants, but cannot resolve conflicts (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 137).  
 
From the Second to the Third Generation: Institutionalising Deliberative 
Democracy 
 
As argued above, second generation deliberative democracy adapts the norms of first 
generation deliberative democracy to features of social complexity, by offering new 
and distinct interpretations of reason giving, preference change, consensus and 
compromise, and applicable forms of communication. This has therefore made the 
theory of deliberative democracy more plausible and practically attainable, enabling a 
more pronounced focus on institutionalisation.  
 
In their discussions on institutionalisation the second generationalists draw from both 
Rawls and Habermas. Rawls’s (1993) constitutional embodiment of the norms of 
deliberative democracy is accepted, along with constitutional rights of freedom of 
expression and assembly, but it owes far more to Habermas’s (1996) vision of 
deliberation in the public sphere as opinion former and agenda setter. For example the 
institutional approach of Bohman (1996, pp. 197-213), Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996, pp. 358-9) stresses the importance of discourse between a plurality of interest-
groups. However, the second generationalists accept that socio-economic inequalities 
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would need to be addressed, to ensure that all groups have an equal opportunity to 
enter the public sphere, and to influence this public discourse, rather than have these 
inequalities bracketed, as Habermas suggests (Bohman, 1996; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996, pp. 273-7). However, second generation deliberative democrats, 
although pointing the way for institutionalisation, have refrained from discussing 
actual and specific institutions. All three books here take-up this baton and offer 
greater levels of detail and an empirical focus in crafting realistic, workable and yet 
normatively desirable deliberatively democratic institutions. In doing this the books 
all contribute to the emergence of a third generation of deliberative democracy. 
 
Within this third generation of deliberative democracy there is a prevalent distinction, 
derived from Hendriks (2006), between micro and macro strategies for 
institutionalizing deliberative democracy. Micro deliberative democracy focuses on 
ideal deliberative procedures, within small-scale structured arenas within the state, 
orientated to decision-making, with impartial participants deliberating together in one 
place and at one time. Alternatively, macro deliberative democracy favours informal 
and unstructured, and spontaneous discursive communication that occurs across space 
and time, aimed at opinion formation, within civil society, outside and often against 
the formal decision-making institutions of the state, with partisan deliberators. Micro 
deliberation tends to be too elitist, excluding too many participants; while in macro 
deliberation, communication can be easily distorted by inequality and self-interest and 
there is a failure to sufficiently empower citizens and make their participation 
effective, unless this deliberative communication is linked to decision-making and 
micro venues.  Therefore, Hendriks (2006) rightly argues that it is essential for both 
micro and macro deliberative democracy to be integrated, and the three books here all 
offer suggestions to achieve this, even if though Baber and Bartlett and O’Flynn do 
not explicitly use this terminology.  Parkinson highlights the need for both types of 
deliberation to be generated and fostered by a range of institutions which should be 
integrated into a complex arrangement, to ensure the weaknesses of each are 
compensated by the strengths of others (Parkinson, 2006, p. 165, pp.17-8). This point 
echoes Baber and Bartlett’s (2005) intention to ensure opinion formation in civil 
society and state decision-making are linked. O’Flynn (2006, p. 152) also sees the 
need for micro deliberative institutions, and conduits to link macro deliberation 
occurring in civil society to these, encouraging the reader to take the relationship 
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between the two extremely seriously.  The third generationalists then have related, but 
still distinct approaches to micro and macro deliberative democracy. Each of these 
will be considered in turn in the following sections. 
Micro Deliberation 
 
Bader and Barber see the need for a range of micro sites for deliberation with the aim 
of ‘controlling the administrative state directly through mass politics’ (Baber and 
Bartlett, 2005, p. 121). These include various mini-publics like deliberative opinion 
polls, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and referendums (Baber and Bartlett, 
2005, p. 127; pp. 229-31). They see such institutions as being far more representative 
of a diverse society than current electoral processes, as they attempt to be a microcosm 
of the applicable citizenry. In addition these institutions are very adaptable to different 
scales, so are perfectly compatible with decentralisation, can effectively incorporate 
experts and, therefore, can effectively adapt to many features of social complexity 
(Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 232). However, such institutions are not sufficient for the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy as they tend to lead to policy proposals 
or an informed aggregation of public opinion, meaning the provision of reasons is 
separated from the making of decisions (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 179): ‘Since the 
legitimacy of law depends on self-legislation, the informal discursive sources of 
democracy must be linked with the formal decision-making processes of government’ 
(Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 180).  
 
To ensure this link is in place Baber and Bartlett advocate decentralisation of decision-
making to partisan micro-deliberative arenas. For them decentralisation facilitates the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy as it ‘places functional limits on the 
influence of hierarchy and establishes mechanisms for the dispersal of democratic 
power’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 181). Moreover, it is much easier to have fully 
inclusive decision-making and to incorporate the diversity of views relevant to a 
particular issue (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 194). In the environmental context they 
consider bioregional organisations like the Northwest Power Planning Council and the 
Columbia River Basin and ‘grassroots ecosystem management’ like Henry’s Fork 
Watershed Council in Idaho’s Snake River Valley, the Applegate Partnership in south-
western Oregon, and the Willapa Alliance of Washington’s Columbia River area, as 
good examples of effective decentralisation. These organisations involve an array of 
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citizens, representing a diversity of interests and opinions in public dialogue, to form 
plans for natural resource conservation.  
 
Parkinson considers original empirical evidence from real life approximations of 
micro instances of deliberative democracy. There is a citizens’ jury in Belfast, held in 
relation to planning and delivery of health services, another case study citizens’ jury 
in Leicester, about the organisation, and configuration, of hospital services within the 
city, and a deliberative opinion poll, on the NHS, held in Manchester. There was also 
a case study that combined macro and micro deliberation in consultation processes 
used to form the NHS plan.  
 
Parkinson argues that micro-deliberation in the formal public sphere could follow the 
lines of the NHS Plan, with specialists and interest groups’ representatives 
deliberating in workshops. The information from such events would then be presented 
to deliberative panels of small groups of citizens, similar to citizens’ juries, resulting 
in citizen recommendations, all covered by the media, and overseen by parliamentary 
committees. Following this the remaining proposals would then be voted on by 
elected representatives, (presumably parliament, but this is not clarified), or a 
referendum (Parkinson, 2006, p. 171). Elements of Parkinson’s suggestions rely on 
the specialist’s workshops and citizens’ panels leading to a reduction in the number of 
plausible options for policy. As was established earlier, in light of high levels of social 
pluralism, this cannot be relied upon.  
 
The dominant, (and as O’Flynn freely admits perhaps only), model of democracy, 
employed in ethnically divided societies, is consociational democracy. This involves 
‘government by elite cartel’, where different ethnic leaders reach compromises 
through bargaining and then justify these bargains to their ethnic groups. Although 
consociational democracy does have the ability, through power sharing, to generate 
some trust in such divided societies, it is a private process that is not dependent upon 
the exchange of reasons and, therefore, does not resemble deliberative democracy 
(O’Flynn, 2006, pp. 101-2). O’Flynn’s study, consequently investigates the theoretical 
possibility of whether deliberative and consociational democracy can be combined to 
facilitate inclusion in divided societies (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 4). He argues, from a 
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normative basis, that such a combination would make the transition from conflict to 
democracy more sustainable than consociational democracy alone. O’Flynn argues 
that consociational decision-making must be reformed to meet the deliberative 
requirements of publicity and reciprocity, by replacing bargaining with deliberation. 
The presence of an opposition, and proportional representational electoral systems are 
proposed to facilitate this. 
 
Marco Deliberation 
 
Parkinson also considered a macro case study, the British disability activist network, 
located solely in the informal public sphere (Parkinson, 2006, p.16). Parkinson is very 
sympathetic to the view that the legitimacy problems associated with scale can be 
resolved through the contestation of discourses between the informal public spheres, 
anchored in civil society, and the formal public spheres, located in the state. This is 
because macro processes of deliberative democracy can include significant numbers 
of people in debate across time and space. The informal public sphere would involve 
the inter-play of civil society organisations and combine activist networks, 
dramaturgical action and media contestation (Parkinson, 2006, p. 168).  
 
Consequently, in macro-deliberation the news media is essential to the facilitation of 
inclusive deliberation, as they spread political communication to the public and state 
actors (Parkinson, 2006, p. 102). In liberal democracies the media is significantly 
flawed, with debate often ill-informed, ignoring ‘issues, institutions and ideas’ and 
enabling powerful interests to dominate (Parkinson, 2006, p. 102). However, the most 
significant problem is that it cannot communicate the complexities of debate 
effectively due to the need to attract, capture and retain an audience, as Parkinson’s 
evidence from deliberative opinion polls indicates (Parkinson, 2006, p. 109). In 
contrast, the Leicester citizens’ jury’s newspaper coverage seemed to effectively fulfil 
the role of communicating the debates to the broader public (Parkinson, 2006, p. 116). 
However, Parkinson thinks this has much to do with the fact that there was a specific 
micro deliberative site for the media to focus their attention on, and to provide 
balanced coverage of. Without this, media coverage will fail to include all arguments 
emanating from the informal public sphere. Therefore, micro deliberative institutions 
can complement the inclusiveness of macro deliberation (Parkinson, 2006, p. 122).   
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A reliance on civil society organisations, as deliberative participants, is in keeping 
with the second generation approach. Consequently, Baber and Bartlett look to ‘civic 
politics’, which would involve social institutions fulfilling key functions, like 
environmental protection, independently of the state (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 
133). Baber and Bartlett see great value in the voluntary nature, member identification, 
and high levels of participation of such associations; suggesting they offer ‘fertile soil 
for the seeds of deliberative democracy’ (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 133). It is 
suggested that these associations can make significant contributions to the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy due to their ability for representation of 
diverse groups, and in doing so open up many issues to public debate that would 
otherwise not make the agenda. Baber and Bartlett further keep with the second 
generation agenda approach by advocating that inequalities between civil society 
associations be reduced through public funds being transferred to associations that 
represent subordinate and disenfranchised groups (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 200). 
Although they are concerned about the co-optation of civil society and the danger this 
presents to environmental social movements, they conclude that the centralisation of 
social movements is unavoidable (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, p. 196).  
 
O’Flynn does not simply suggest that we make consociational structures more 
deliberative, but looks to make such political institutions more open and responsive to 
citizens’ deliberation within civil society too.  Consociational democracy is criticised 
for not having a sufficient focus on civil society, where crosscutting identities and 
interests can be articulated and represented. Such processes are possible and essential, 
because although in ethnically divided societies ethnic claims and conflict will 
inevitably take precedent, other demands and claims must be made, met, and 
resolved: ‘citizens will not be able to think of themselves as sharing a common 
national identity unless there is some common basis upon which they can engage with 
one another on non-ethnic terms’ (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 141).  
 
O’Flynn argues that the discourse that occurs and emerges, within and between the 
array of cross-cutting networks, enables representation of a diversity of interests and 
facilitates citizens to hear the views and experiences of other groups and to conceive 
of themselves as citizens rather than just a member of an ethnic group (O’Flynn, 
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2006, p. 142). Therefore polarised groups are brought into contact, which helps foster 
tolerance, encourages civic identity formation, and increases the scope for 
compromise. Nevertheless, the state must support weaker groups to ensure that they 
are not excluded from these processes and can effectively represent themselves 
(O’Flynn, 2006, pp. 149-50). Once again this is indicative of an attempt at realising 
the insights of the second generation approach.  
 
Civil society can also act as a counter to the power of political elites, ensuring that the 
decisions they do make within the consociational structures are publicly justified to 
all, and are consequently more compatible with the norms of deliberative democracy. 
It is the presence of opposition that causes people to publicly justify their preferences 
and decisions and therefore encourages the approximation of deliberative democracy 
(O’Flynn, 2006, p. 157). This is essential in a consociational democracy where the 
elites, for all ethnic groups, are included in government, resulting in the absence for 
the need for public justification of decisions. This means there is a lack of reciprocity, 
and no opposition to the government, so no need for public reason (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 
156). Therefore, it is unclear whether the decisions emerging from consociational 
structures have been arrived at through bargaining or deliberation and if all interests 
have genuinely been considered.  
 
Contrasting Approaches to Public Policy 
 
Despite the apparent influence of second generation deliberative democracy on the 
Baber and Bartlett, O’Flynn, and Parkinson and the fact that micro and macro 
deliberation can be identified in all three approaches to institutional design, the 
differences between each should be apparent from the discussion above. Many of 
these differences are due to the fact that each author is attempting to establish the 
conditions required for deliberative policy-making in very different contexts. Baber 
and Bartlett focus on environmental policy, Parkinson and O’Flynn on public policy 
more generally, the former in western liberal democracies and the latter in deeply 
divided societies. Consequently they also address distinct issues, particular to the 
context. This highlights the diversity of third generation deliberative democracy. For 
Baber and Bartlett the issue is deliberative democracy across borders, for Parkinson it 
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is deliberative agenda-setting, and for O’Flynn it is constructing an inclusive national 
identity. 
 
 
Transnational Deliberative Democracy 
 
Baber and Bartlett argue that transnational institutions are necessary if deliberative 
institutions are to include all those affected by a decision and if environmental 
problems are to be met, in a globalizing world. Approximating democratic deliberation 
across borders is an issue which the second generationalists have turned their attention 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Bohman, 2007). Whereas aggregation of preferences 
across borders is complex, deliberation is much more attainable. Once again Baber 
and Bartlett see nongovernmental organisations making a significant contribution to 
cross-border deliberation and point to the International Whaling Commission as a 
good example of an international organisation that has facilitated effective deliberation 
amongst key NGOs. However, these macro discursive processes need to be lined to 
micro decision-making. The EU’s European Environmental Bureau is seen as an 
appropriate model to achieve this (Baber and Bartlett, 2005, pp. 136-41).  
 
Deliberative Agenda Setting 
 
In all the micro-deliberative case studies Parkinson considered, the limitation of the 
agenda proved to be a significant issue in relation to their legitimacy (Parkinson, 
2006, p. 128). This might be inevitable with micro deliberative sites as they need a 
relatively narrow and focused agenda to ensure that the issue is thoroughly 
deliberated, the absence of which was a weakness of the Belfast citizens’ jury 
(Parkinson, 2006, p. 132). The principal problem with this is that it means the micro 
process of deliberation can be framed. In the citizens’ juries in Leicester and Belfast 
the participants felt the agenda had been excessively restricted prior to the 
commencement of the forums, with scope of decisions and funds available to support 
the recommendations from the jury severely limited in both cases (Parkinson, 2006, p. 
48 & 50). To amend this undemocratic agenda setting Parkinson suggests that local 
and national governments have committees whose function is to gather submissions 
from civil society groups. This could be combined with processes like an ‘electronic 
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town hall’ where thousands of citizens would assemble to debate and vote on the 
agenda before it is formalised (Parkinson, 2006, p. 170), making agenda setting a 
more equal and deliberative process. 
National Identity 
 
Ultimately O’Flynn’s book addresses whether it is possible to generate and sustain a 
national identity in divided societies, where there is also a need to ‘institutionally 
recognise and accommodate competing ethnic identities’ (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 32). In 
the divided societies that O’Flynn considers, there is a commitment to live together 
and share political power and a political system, but they still require some bond to 
enable them to move to a sustainable democracy (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 36).  
 
O’Flynn is fully aware of, and addresses, the tension that exists between the need for 
democracy to be grounded by a common national identity, and how such a ‘common’ 
identity  can exclude many: ‘the demand for homogeneity tends to narrow the range of 
acceptable interpretations of a society’s national identity and corresponding forms of 
political expression’ (O’Flynn, 2006, p. 126). It is such considerations that have 
prompted Habermas to argue ‘democratic citizenship need not be rooted in the 
national identity of a people’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 500). The second generation 
deliberative democrats are even more adamant that an identity cannot be shared by all 
in diverse societies. They argue that unity and consensus upon a shared national, or 
cultural identity, cannot be a prerequisite for deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
models that assume a common identity is in place, prior to the commencement of 
deliberation, fail to meet the condition of Rawls’s reasonable pluralism, which 
requires that; ‘no comprehensive moral or religious view provides a defining condition 
of membership of the foundation of the authorization to exercise political power’ 
(Cohen, 1997, p. 408).  O’Flynn accepts that a genuinely common national identity 
cannot be in place prior to the commencement of deliberative democracy, given the 
diversity of identities that exist in modern multicultural and ethnically divided 
societies, it is unlikely that shared understandings of a national identity will exist prior 
to debate. However, discursive challenges to perceived shared national cultural norms 
and values can deteriorate the trust necessary for public deliberation. Yet, if we 
exclude issues of the content of national identity from collective deliberation, then 
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minority cultural groups are excluded from the prevailing identity (O’Flynn, 2006; 
Festenstein, 2005, p. 153; Elstub, 2008, pp. 93-4).  
 
For O’Flynn, deliberative democracy is an important mechanism to generate the 
normative standards that, if approximated in practice, can generate ‘an overarching 
civic identity’ that can include citizens with diverse ethnic affiliations (O’Flynn, 2006, 
pp. 8-9, p. 36).  This is because deliberative democracy seeks to ensure ‘equal 
citizenship to all individual members, irrespective of their more particular affiliations’ 
and moreover, means that citizens and groups are in control over the nature of this 
civic identity (O’Flynn, 2006, pp. 75-6). However, O’Flynn fails to consider what is to 
ground the trust required to ensure deliberative obligations are abided by in the first 
place, in order for this civic identity to be generated. This inclusion, derived from the 
reciprocity and publicity inherent in democratic deliberation, helps create, but also 
relies upon, the presence of a collective civic identity to ground democratic processes. 
It seems we have come full circle. The solution might once again be civil society. 
Cohen and Rogers have suggested a ‘civic consciousness’, that includes a recognition 
and commitment to democratic procedures and norms, can be generated through 
participation in civil society (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, pp. 43-4). As this identity only 
requires a common set of general political values through which all other conflicts 
should be resolved, it is open to a plurality of identities, and yet could still provide the 
foundation of trust necessary for the commencement of deliberative democracy 
(Elstub, 2008, p. 130). Whether this is possible in divided societies though, is another 
question. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Second generation deliberative democracy reconciled the first generation theories of 
Rawls and Habermas with the empirical realities of social complexity, making the 
theory of deliberative democracy more realistic, and practically achievable in the 
process. In doing this second generation deliberative democracy offers distinct 
interpretations of public reason, preference change, consensus and forms of applicable 
communication within deliberative democracy. All these features are accepted, to 
varying extents, by Baber and Bartlett (2005), O’Flynn (2006) and Parkinson (2006). 
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These authors are contributing to the formation of a third generation of deliberative 
democracy that has an increasing institutional and empirical focus. Essentially the 
third generation deliberative democratic theorists attempt to put second generation 
deliberative democracy in to practice in contrasting contexts.  
 
The evolutionary developments of deliberative democracy away from the original 
assertions of those from the first generation have led Saward (2003, p.161) to suggest 
that democratic theory has now moved ‘beyond deliberative democracy’. Neither does 
he see this development negatively. Rather Saward encourages the move away from 
thinking of contrasting democratic models, to a more ‘ecumenical’ understanding of 
democracy that is ‘sensitive to context, open-ended, productive, and adaptable’. 
Through its second and third generations, deliberative democracy has certainly 
become more contextualised, indefinite, and tractable, so it could be argued that as 
deliberative democracy evolves it moves more towards the overarching approach to 
democracy craved by Saward. 
 
Nevertheless all three books considered here still assert the importance of a 
‘deliberative’ model of democracy, rather than democracy per se. This is precisely to 
do with the normative elements, associated with this model, established by the first 
generation deliberative democrats. Saward (2003) is certainly right that deliberation is 
not sufficient and many other institutional devices are essential to promote democracy. 
However, as Elstub (2008, pp. 63-5) and Thompson (2008) argue a focus on 
‘deliberative’ democracy is still justified as theories of democracy like rational choice 
theory, social choice theory, competitive pluralism and elitism exist, and are based on 
power and self interest and see no role for deliberation. Moreover, the role of these 
other devices should be justified from a ‘deliberative perspective’ (Thompson, 2008, 
p. 513 & 515).  
 
Therefore, while these third generation deliberative democrats should be applauded for 
seriously considering how deliberative democracy could operate in practice, caution is 
required. If deliberative democracy accommodates the features of social complexity 
too excessively, and comes to resemble the current institutional frameworks too 
closely, it will be more amenable to practice, but will cease to be a critical theory that 
offers a radical alternative to liberal democracy, and the distinct features of the 
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deliberative model will be lost. As Thompson explains ‘theory challenges political 
reality. It is not supposed to accept as given the reality that political science purports 
to describe and explain. It is intended to be critical, not acquiescent’ (Thompson, 
2008, p. 499). Thompson (2008) further argues that although empirical research on 
deliberative democracy is essential to deepening theoretical understandings of 
democracy, it must be guided by normative theory. There is then a need for a 
symbiotic relationship between the two, which is difficult to achieve. Democratic 
theory must remain at a critical distance from reality, if it is to provide suggestions for 
‘externally justifiable’ institutional reform. Yet this distance must not be excessive or 
these suggestions will fail to provide practical guidance (O’Flynn, 2006, pp. 22-3). 
Deliberative democracy’s third generation, and the three books considered here, 
effectively manage this challenging balancing act. Other third generation deliberative 
democrats must strive to do the same, if deliberative democracy is to progress as a 
realisable and desirable ideal. The concern is that the trend of compromising the 
normative elements of the theory at the expense of accommodating current reality will 
continue. Therefore, we must not lose sight of the first generation Habermasian and 
Rawlsian normative arguments that first propelled deliberative democracy to its 
dominant role in studies of democracy. 
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